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Abstract 
This paper addresses household-level disaster financing strategies of the poor in 
developing countries within the context of current poverty trap discussions. It presents 
findings on risk perceptions and loss financing practices in relation to floods and 
droughts in Uttar Pradesh, India. The study found that, due to financial shocks, the risk 
of households falling below the subsistence level and into a poverty trap is high. In this 
context, the paper links current approaches in household welfare-driven disaster risk 
financing to the survey results and provides policy recommendations.  
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Introduction 
 
Natural hazards such as earthquakes, droughts and floods can cause devastating 
environmental and socioeconomic losses (Mechler 2004; Hochrainer 2006; Tran and 
Shaw 2007; Noy 2009). The poorer segments of society especially bear the greatest risk 
of detrimental disaster impacts due to their limited coping capacities such as lack of 
access to savings and credit, as well as higher physical vulnerability, due for example to 
low quality buildings (Blaikie et al. 1994; Benson and Clay 2004). This can be shown 
empirically by comparing the average number of fatalities per event (or losses per GDP) 
for high and low income country groups during the recent past (Figure 1). While high 
income countries incurred an average of three fatalities per disaster, low income countries 
incurred an average of 215 fatalities per event, i.e., 70 times higher. Similarly, losses as a 
percentage of GDP per event are much more severe for low income countries (13 
percent) compared to high income countries (3.7 percent). 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Average Fatalities and Losses as Percent of GDP Per 
Disaster for High, Middle and Low Income Countries Between 1980 and 2004.  
  
Source: Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler and Pflug 2005. 
 
In addition to the large direct impacts of natural disasters, especially on the poor, 
there is a growing awareness of the importance of the indirect long-term effects of such 
shocks on households and their livelihoods. The so-called “poverty trap”, which is a 
situation in which recovery is not possible without external assistance, is now an 
important concept for tackling the issue of disaster financing and management, especially 
from a dynamic livelihood perspective (Bowels, Durlauf and Hoff 2006; Barrett et al. 
2007). Empirical research in Ethiopia and Honduras by Carter et al. (2007) revealed that 
the poorest households struggle most with shocks that can trap them in an impoverished 
status from which they cannot escape. Such realities must be considered also from a 
donor perspective; limiting support to post-disaster assistance in times of crisis may not 
be sustainable in the long run and proactive strategies to decrease and spread risk should 
therefore also be investigated and supported (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler and Pflug 2005, 
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Miles and Morse 2007). Finally, disaster-related problems can easily transform into 
development challenges and can be considered as mutually dependent, sometimes 
multiplying the negative effects of disasters over the long-term (Mechler 2004; Hallegatte 
2008).  
In an effort to shed more light on the role of disasters in the context of current poverty 
trap discussions this paper (i) analyzes the different recovery strategies for disaster 
impacts for very poor households via detailed standardized household interviews, (ii) 
discusses the results in the context of poverty trap potentials, and (iii) provides 
suggestions on how poverty traps can be incorporated within dynamic risk-based 
livelihood modelling approaches, i.e., livelihood models where path dependencies and 
probabilities of events are explicitly incorporated. The results found in this paper serve as 
the starting point of a effort in which specific livelihood models are constructed and 
tested. The study site was in Uttar Pradesh which, in addition to facing a multitude of 
climate and weather-driven hazards, is one of the largest and poorest states in India. The 
following questions are specifically addressed within this paper: 
 
• Question 1: What are the specific problems of disaster recovery financing for the 
poor, both from demand- and supply-side perspectives? 
• Question 2: How can poverty trap issues be incorporated within disaster recovery 
financing decision-making? What are the challenges and limitations, and how 
could possible solutions look? 
• Question 3 (empirical): Who are the rural communities in eastern Uttar Pradesh? 
• Question 4 (empirical): What are their livelihoods, incomes and financial flows? 
• Question 5 (empirical): How do communities perceive risk and how do hazards 
impact them, primarily in financial terms? 
• Question 6 (empirical): How do they cope with hazards financially and what are 
the limitations they face? 
• Question 7 (empirical): Are there further opportunities for reducing the financial 
impacts of disasters? 
• Question 8: What are the policy implications of improved understanding gained 
from the questions above in the specific context of poverty traps at the household 
level? 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the first and part of the second 
question are addressed. Section three then introduces the study area and survey methods. 
In section four, the statistical analyses of the interviews are presented and discussed, i.e., 
questions three to seven are analyzed. Section five summarizes the findings in terms of 
remaining gaps and suggestions for the future (especially for Question 2), and ends with a 
discussion of potential policy interventions in light of poverty trap issues (Question 
eight). 
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Background and Motivation 
 
We start with an explanation of key terms in the hazard management field that are needed 
for our analysis and proceed with a discussion of the current poverty trap literature.   
 
Disasters and Hazard Management 
 
Disaster impacts can be grouped into economic (e.g., buildings destroyed), humanitarian 
(e.g., lives lost, people affected, psycho-social trauma) and ecological effects (e.g., 
damage to ecosystems, loss of arable land). Furthermore, the effects can be separated 
temporally into direct and indirect (long-term) effects—sometimes referred to as stock 
and flow effects, respectively (Mechler 2004). Direct effects happen due to the disaster 
itself or follow-on destruction, e.g., fires. Indirect effects occur as a consequence of the 
direct losses, e.g., business interruption, wage loss, or loss in biodiversity. The magnitude 
of the direct effects is usually determined by three pre-impact conditions that together 
determine risk: hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (Grossi and Kunreuther 2005). 
Hazard analysis involves identifying the type of hazards affecting a certain area with 
specific intensity and frequency. Assessing exposure involves analyzing the relevant 
elements (population, assets) exposed to hazards in a given area. Vulnerability is the most 
controversial concept in the literature as it is a multidimensional concept encompassing a 
large number of factors that can be grouped into physical, economical, social and 
environmental factors (GTZ 2004) as outlined in the Figure 2 and listed below: 
 
• Physical: related to the susceptibility to damage of infrastructure such as houses, 
dams or roads. 
• Social: defined by the ability to cope with impacts at the individual level as well as 
referring to the existence and robustness of institutions to deal with and respond to 
natural disaster. 
! Economic: refers to the economic or financial capacity to refinance losses and recover 
quickly to a previously planned economic activity path. This may relate to private 
individuals as well as the commercial sector, asset bases and financing arrangements, 
or to governments that often bear a large share of a country’s risk and losses. 
! Environmental: a function of factors such as land and water use, biodiversity and 
stability of ecosystems. 
 
Vulnerability is always defined in reference to one or more hazards. Hence, different 
types of vulnerabilities are seen as especially important across disciplines. While in the 
natural and actuarial science disciplines, vulnerability is usually referred to as physical 
vulnerability, i.e. susceptibility to damage which is used for example in catastrophe 
 Hochrainer: Disaster Poverty Traps 
 
61 
model approaches to calculate the probability (risk) of losses (Grossi and Kunreuther 
2005), in the social sciences social vulnerability defined as susceptibility to behavioural 
changes, is seen as an additional important element as it affects exposure, physical 
vulnerability and long term consequences (see Lindell, Prater and Perry 2006). To avoid 
confusion, we will always explicitly refer in the text to the specific type of vulnerability 
under discussion.  
 
Figure 2. Classification of Vulnerability Factors.  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
Source: Kohler et al. 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (GTZ 2004) 
 
To decrease the risk of catastrophic events to acceptable levels, “environmental risk 
management” (Lindell and Perry 2004) is needed. This can be conceptualized in terms of 
four phases: disaster mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response and 
disaster recovery. Disaster mitigation activities aim to eliminate or reduce the impacts of 
a disaster either by modifying the event system (which is usually not possible for natural 
hazards) or the human system or both. Emergency preparedness refers to the need for 
contingency plans, procedures and resources shortly after an event, so that a timely and 
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effective emergency response can be established. Emergency response starts with the 
detection of the event and ends with the stabilization of the situation and functioning of 
the community, society and/or country to acceptable levels. The final phase is disaster 
recovery, which can be separated into short-term (relief and rehabilitation) and long-term 
(reconstruction) phases.  
Disaster recovery financing mechanisms, including ex-post measures such as loans 
and grants as well as ex-ante measures such as hazard insurance, are important to 
decrease the economic vulnerability of an agent. However, regarding Question 1 in the 
introduction, poor countries generally lack insurance markets or affordable premiums 
(Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2005). Hence, poor households are often primarily dependent on 
informal recovery financing strategies, such as geographical diversification through 
family networks and migration, some limited savings and/or informal insurance 
arrangements with neighbours (Benson and Clay 2000; Warner, Bouwer and Ammann 
2007). While such strategies are useful for more frequent events, they tend to fail in the 
face of larger-scale disasters as spatial diversification and informal arrangements are 
often overwhelmed (Benson and Clay 2004). Due to the failure of traditional recovery 
mechanisms negative long-term consequences (high indebtedness) can be expected, 
potentially leading into a poverty trap situation. 
 
Poverty Traps 
 
Poverty trap research is a relatively new field but should be an important concept within 
the disaster management community, partly due to its relevance for novel disaster 
recovery financing strategies such as index-based insurance (Question 2 in the 
introduction section will now be addressed). Discussions on how to define the root causes 
of poverty traps are closely related with questions addressing if empirical evidence of 
such traps can be found. A prominent empirical study, amongst others, that found 
evidence for the existence of poverty traps was performed by Carter et al. (2007) for 
Honduras and Ethiopia. The authors defined a poverty trap in regards to a minimum asset 
threshold, below which livelihood growth is not feasible anymore. By analyzing the asset 
dynamics of households due to severe environmental shocks in both countries they 
estimated threshold models of poverty traps and found low-level equilibriums in both 
cases. For example they concluded, while pointing out that some strong assumptions had 
to be made, Honduran households falling below an asset threshold of $250 are expected 
to fall into such traps. An important empirical observation in the case of Ethiopia was 
that, even in times of severe losses and consequently lower income and consumption, 
poor households try to hold on to their few assets, which is seen as an expected behaviour 
in the face of a poverty trap (Carter et al. 2007). However, empirical evidence of the 
suggested poverty trap mechanism in the literature is still challenged and heavily 
discussed (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005; Barnett et al. 2008; and especially Perry et 
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al. 2006 on virtuous and vicious circles). For example, based on aggregate growth models 
by Kraay and Raddatz (2007), no empirical evidence was found that poverty traps arise 
due to low savings or low technology at low levels of development, challenging the idea 
that large scaling-up of aid to the poorest countries could “jump-start” a sustainable 
growth process. Antman and McKenzie (2007) included non-linear income dynamics at 
the household level in urban Mexico by using pseudo panel methods but did not find 
indications of a poverty trap (however, it was observed that below some threshold the 
growth process would take rather long).  
This paper cannot add value to the empirical observation of poverty traps because our 
disaster recovery financing and poverty analysis is unavoidably backwards-looking and, 
without any longitudinal or panel data, is unable to distinguish between chronic and 
transitory poverty or between structural and stochastic transition limits. However, the 
findings presented here are needed to provide baseline estimates for calibration and 
testing of recovery financing strategies within dynamic poverty or livelihood models 
(fourth generation approaches, cf. Carter and Barret 2006). In addition, these findings 
identify behavioural responses to shocks such as natural disasters; provide information 
about risk perception, emergency response, and recovery strategies; and identify current 
stocks of assets and financial flows for given household groups. Such results are of 
utmost importance for donors and policy makers trying to answer the question how the 
poorest of the poor can best be helped to help themselves. This includes insights on what 
interventions would be best to maintain households on a sustainable growth path or at 
least above the subsistence level over the long run. These objectives could be achieved 
by, for example, creating access to insurance markets, credit instruments, structural 
mitigation measures and new novel insurance products that have been especially 
designed for the poor, namely index-based insurance.  
The combination of recovery financing strategies within poverty trap models is also 
still in its infancy. Barret et al. (2007) uses threshold-based poverty trap concepts to 
determine which kind of risk financing strategy would fit best, dependent on the current 
wealth status of households. Sometimes poverty traps are only one dimension within a 
general economic growth model approach (such as analysis of development traps 
(Azardiadis and Drazen 1990) or business cycle models (Schenk-Hoppe 2005). In such 
studies poverty traps represent a point of no return, while all other stable (equilibrium) 
states (Barrett and Swallow 2006) can be seen as a result of choices reflecting different 
trade-offs between stability and growth. However, stock (asset based) and flow effects 
are not clearly distinguished within the poverty trap literature, but would be important for 
determining long-term livelihood patterns. For example, borrowing capacity is usually 
assumed to be zero for the poor, but this is not always the case, as our survey results 
show. It is interesting to note that risk perceptions of households are often neglected too. 
However, household behavioural responses are dependent on the perception of the threat, 
available protective actions, and their own capacities (Slovic 2000; Lindell and Perry 
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2004). Especially the perception of personal risk, e.g., the expectation of personal 
exposure to property damage, is a critical variable in the decision process (for a 
comprehensive discussion see Lindell and Perry 2004).  
While poverty trap models are very useful to understand possible household 
livelihood dynamics, there is the additional challenge that while the concepts and 
mathematical treatment of/against poverty traps becomes more sophisticated, the realities 
of people in poverty are less and less well understood. Official statistics often do not 
address these groups in sufficient detail to enable more than qualitative inputs. 
Quantitative poverty trap models cannot be built without such additional data, as they are 
critical within every livelihood model approach. Without this data, models cannot be 
calibrated nor can policy recommendations be formulated based on conclusive results, as 
the baseline (real) case cannot be determined. We now proceed to answer Questions 3 to 
7, first describing the study area in more detail and explaining the methodology used. 
 
Study Area and Methodology 
 
Uttar Pradesh (UP, see Figure 3) is one of the largest (geographically) and poorest 
states in India with an annual per capita income of around INR 10,500 (US$ 265) and 
roughly 40 percent of its population considered below the poverty line. It (according to 
the 2001 Census) continues to be the most populated state in the country, despite the state 
of Uttarankhand being carved out of it in 2000. UP has a population of over 166 million, 
of which approximately 80 percent reside in rural areas. UP belongs to the lowest strata 
of development, based on the Human Development Index (HDI) value (0.528 in 2006). 
UP’s economy has been predominantly agrarian (it is considered the bread basket of 
India) and the performance of agriculture and allied activities are critical in determining 
the growth rate of its economy. The primary sector, which is the part of the economy that 
collects and process natural resources such as raw material and basic foods (e.g., 
agriculture, mining, forestry, farming, fishing) contributed around 36.8% to the State’s 
income in 2003-04 and provided employment to 66% of all workers (Kumar 2005). 
However, the share of this sector in state income has been declining over recent years 
while the contribution of the tertiary sector, the sector that provides services to the 
general population and to businesses, has been increasing.  
UP faces many natural hazards, primarily climate and weather-driven: floods, 
droughts and fire. Annually around 2.7 million hectares are affected by floods in the State 
resulting in annual losses of INR 4.32 billion (US$ 93 million). In recent years, droughts 
have also taken a significant toll, with 2002 and 2004 experiencing severe events 
resulting in losses to crops (including livestock) and property amounting to INR 75.40 
billion (US$ 1.6 billion) and INR 72.92 billion (US$ 1.57 billion), respectively (Disaster 
Management Cell, Government of Uttar Pradesh). 
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The Rohini Basin, which includes part of the districts of Gorakhpur and Maharajganj 
in eastern Uttar Pradesh, was selected as the study area due to its substantial drought and 
flood risk as well as high poverty levels. Considering the importance of local 
geographical location with regards to the different hazards, two different sampling 
strategies were developed. 
 
Figure 3. Map of India, Uttar Pradesh state and the districts of  
Gorakhpur and Maharajganj. 
 
For flood sampling, a two stage strategy was adopted. Villages were selected from 
the, upper, middle and lower sections of the Rohini River Basin. Villages were then 
selected within each of these basin sections based on their distance from the river banks. 
A complete list of existing villages was compiled on the basis of Census of India 2001. 
After random sampling, 28 villages were visited to (i) collect preliminary information by 
generating basic social-resource maps, (ii) verify the distances of villages from river 
banks, and (iii) collect information on decentralized community-driven flood 
management interventions implemented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Seventeen villages were ultimately selected for detailed surveys, again based on their 
location in the different basin sections and distances from the river banks. They are 
spread over an area of 1945 sq. km within both districts of Gorakhpur and Maharajganj. 
A total of 204 households were then randomly selected from these villages. Although 
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data was collected for more households (250), 46 could not be used for analysis as the 
responses were not consistent throughout the questionnaire. 
The identification of the set of villages for the drought survey was different than for 
the flood survey. Villages were chosen based on simple random sampling on a single 
level of stratification. Specifically, the study area was identified on the basis of 
government declarations, e.g., Nautanwa tehsil (an administrative sub-district) was 
declared “drought affected” by the UP Government in 2004. Villages were classified on 
the basis of one important parameter for drought management, namely availability of 
irrigation. A random selection was performed on the basis of these criteria and ten 
villages were selected; three where government group tube-wells existed, three that were 
within the command area of a government irrigation canal, and four where there was no 
government irrigation. A random sampling of households in these villages was 
performed, resulting in the selection of 120 households.  
The different sampling sizes for the flood and drought surveys are a result of the 
different sizes of the study areas. For drought, the study area comprised one tehsil, 
whereas for flood it was the entire basin (consisting of six tehsils). Thus, the flood 
affected households were spread over a larger area than the drought affected households 
resulting in the sample size for floods (204) being higher than that for drought (120). 
The process of primary data collection was initiated with an exploratory visit 
involving a brief pilot study. The pilot study involved interviews and shared learning 
dialogues in both flood and drought affected villages. Primary data was collected through 
household surveys, with separate questionnaires developed for flood and drought study 
areas. Despite focusing on different hazards, both questionnaires queried common 
household-specific information including income, expenditure patterns, savings, 
borrowing, and risk financing strategies. Based on data requirements and pilot study 
observations, these field-based questionnaires were first formulated in English. A review 
of existing literature (for example Sinha 1999; Rathore 2005; Pandey et al. 2007) and 
available secondary data (Census of India, Statistical Abstract of Government of Uttar 
Pradesh and published data of other government departments) was concurrently 
undertaken to support finalization of the questionnaires. Testing was performed in 
randomly selected households from the set of predefined villages covering the entire 
study area. Responses from the testing were used to further modify the questionnaires 
resulting in a final draft that was translated into the local language (Hindi), and the 
consistency of these questionnaires were then checked by back-translating into English. 
Questionnaire responses were coded and measured in different scales, resulting in 
most of the collected data being quantitative. Questions related to disaster perceptions, 
financial coping, and risk financing perspectives were either represented on 5 point Likert 
or nominal scales. Similarly, questions pertaining to basic household financial 
characteristics and disaster impacts were measured using both ratio and nominal scales. 
Although some questions were open ended and qualitative in nature, they pertained 
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mostly to the perception of the households regarding disaster events and disaster risk 
reduction options.  
Surveying targeted the heads of households, under the assumption that he/she was the 
one who was best able to recall and quantify household economic activities and coping 
strategies. On average, each interview took around 35-40 minutes to fill the 
questionnaires. The survey was carried out for a period of four months covering the late-
winter and early-spring season 2007-08, as villagers are not busy with cultivation-related 
work during this period. 
Statistical tests for differences between sub-groups, either in the drought or flood 
hazard sample or both, was based on t-tests (where variables were normally distributed) 
or non-parametric tests such as the Mann-Whitney U test. The differences are considered 
to be significant or highly significant if the corresponding p-values of the respective tests 
are p ! 0.05 or 0.01, respectively. Sometimes, especially if the skewness coefficient was 
too high, the median was used instead of the mean. To avoid confusion it is always stated 
explicitly which measure is used. Furthermore, we sometimes distinguish (where 
meaningful) between different wealth classes in the sample using the official poverty line 
definitions of the Government of India (see Table 1), and between the flood and drought 
samples. 
 
Table 1. Wealth Classes Based on the Poverty Line Definition by the Government of 
India Derived From Minimum Annual Consumption Requirements.  
 
 
Class 
 
Annual consumption per person  
(in INR) 
 
Annual consumption 
per person (US) 
Class Name 
(unofficial, only 
for reference) 
1 0-4380 (below poverty line “BPL”) < $111 Very poor 
2 4381-6576 (1-1.5*PL) $111 - $166 Poor 
3 6577-8760 (1.5-2*PL) $166 - $222 Middle 
4 >8761 (2*PL) > $222 Rich 
 
Results are categorized by different household disaster recovery financing aspects and 
the questions stated in the Introduction: disaster perceptions, basic financial 
characteristics, disaster impacts, utilized financial coping mechanisms, and risk financing 
perspectives. 
 
Results 
 
The total sample size was 324 with 204 observations in the flood sample and 120 in 
the drought sample. We start first with socio-economic and other general relevant 
information of the respective samples (i.e., Questions 3 and 4).  
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Socio-economic Household Characteristics 
 
The average household size is similar in both samples with seven persons (median) per 
household, receiving an average annual income of about $721 (all monetary values are 
reported in US, having been converted from Indian Rupees (INR) using the average 
exchange rate during the period of survey of 39.5 INR/US) (see table 2).   
 
Table 2. Median Household Income,  
Land Owned, Debt, and Savings. 
 
Wealth 
Class 
 
Percent of 
sample 
Annual 
Household 
Income 
 
Land owned  
(in ha) 
Total 
outstanding 
loan(s) 
 
 
Savings 
All 100.0 $721  0.320 $76 $13 
Very poor 40.9 $458 0.203 $51 $0 
Poor 24.7 $814 0.324 $58 $13 
Middle 12.8 $1,104 0.608 $101 $13 
Rich 21.6 $2,075 0.810 $152 $20 
 
All of the variables in Table 2 except for outstanding loans show highly significant 
differences according to wealth class (Kruskal Wallis test for Income H = 188.26, p < 
.000, df = 3; Land size H = 24.26, p < .000, df = 3; Savings H = 19.74, p <.000, df = 3). 
The very poor are (unsurprisingly) far worse off than the other groups, except for 
outstanding loans where the poor have only slightly higher loans than the very poor. 
Regarding castes, nearly 60 percent of the total sample is OBC (other backward 
classes), being nearly the same in both samples (55.8% for drought and 61.6% for flood). 
The caste system remains a social and political reality in India that has impacts on 
socioeconomic opportunities (Jeffery, Jeffery and Jeffery 2005). There are large wealth 
variations within each caste, particularly when broad caste categories are defined as in 
this study. Despite this, differences between income and general caste grouping were 
found highly significant (Kruskal Wallis H = 24.72, p <. 0001, df = 2) for the study 
region (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Caste Distribution and Average (Median) Annual Income. 
 
Caste 
Sample  
percent 
Average annual 
household income 
Scheduled Tribes & Castes (Dalit & Adivasi) 27 $557 
Other Backwards Classes (OBC) 59 $785 
General Caste 14 $924 
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Using the official poverty line (Table 1) as defined by the Government of India, 53 
percent of the total sample is living below the poverty line. The percentage below the 
poverty line in the drought sample (63%) is (highly) significantly greater ("2 = 13.89, 
p<.0001, df = 1) than in the flood sample (48%). Thirty five percent of the households 
have a migrant in their family (on average one per household). The main reason for 
migration (63%) was to compensate losses in household income, with an average time of 
migration of about six months. 
Regarding housing, around 55 percent of households live in brick (Pucca) houses, 30 
percent in mud houses (Kaccha), with the remainder in semi-pucca houses. The majority 
of houses (73%) lack electricity. Time spent in constructing houses (including latrines) 
was around 72 days. Around 70 percent of households have some form of drinking water 
supply, mainly from open dug wells and tube wells/hand pumps. Only 16 percent of the 
total sample have irrigation pipes, as well as private toilets.  
Regarding assets, around 68 percent of households have grain storages in their house, 
19 percent have a land-line or mobile phone, 23 percent own a television, and only 18 
percent own a radio. Eighty five percent of the households own land, with a median size 
of 0.32 hectare. While there were no significant differences between the flood and 
drought samples, there are highly significant differences of land holding among the 
wealth classes (Kruskal-Wallis H = 24.261, p <.0001, df = 3). 
In terms of livelihoods, 66 percent of households earn their primary income from 
farming, 15 percent from agricultural labour, and 14 percent from non-farm wage labour. 
Nearly all households engaged in farming cultivate twice a year with 20 percent using 
HYV (high yield variety) seeds, 45 percent using traditional seeds, and 35 percent using 
both types. Seventy three percent of households own at least some kind of livestock. 
Financially, 69 percent of households have at least one outstanding loan. Table 4 
gives an overview of the different loan sources. Reasons for taking a loan include buying 
agricultural inputs (32%), medical expenditures (17%) and marriage obligations (16.6%). 
Furthermore, although Table 2 indicates that the current total outstanding loan amount in 
absolute terms is highest for the “rich” class; in comparison to relative income they are 
the least indebted, while the poor and very poor are the most indebted. 
Finally, 26 percent of households lack saving accounts, 17 percent participate in 
savings schemes within a Self Help Group (only 10 percent of the total respondents are 
actual members of SHGs), and the rest (57%) have accounts with banks and post offices. 
The savings are generally very low for all classes.   
 
Disaster Perceptions 
 
The greatest perceived disaster risks in the Rohini Basin are flood and drought; however, 
the importance of commodity price shocks cannot be ignored (Figure 4). Eighty six 
percent of drought survey respondents consider drought impacts on their families to be 
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high and 80 percent of flood survey respondents say the same for flood. Considering the 
thematic nature of the surveys and associated discussions, these results could be biased. 
On the other hand, losses in terms of income indicate that the impact levels of these 
hazards are indeed very high.  
 
Table 4. Sources for Loans (Percentage of Responses). 
Source Drought Flood Combined 
Family member 9 4 6 
Friend or neighbour 18 23 21 
Self-help group (SHG) & other 
savings groups 
 
2 
 
8 
 
6 
Shopkeeper 3 3 4 
Money lender 18 15 16 
Grameen bank 25 15 19 
Nationalized bank 15 19 17 
Cooperative bank 7 7 7 
Others 3 7 6 
 
The dependence of the population on agriculture, as well as the sensitivity of this 
livelihood to external factors, is clearly demonstrated by the global price rise impacts in 
India (Thakurta 2008). A high rate of inflation in India is a recent phenomenon and, 
beginning in 2008, there has been a dramatic rise in the price of rice and other basic 
foodstuffs. However, the survey was performed before this increase and it is therefore 
assumed that the perceived risk of increased commodity prices is based on past 
experiences. Considering that price shocks, drought, and the death of income earners all 
result in primarily monetary losses (as opposed to property), as are damages caused by 
floods (in addition to property losses), the financial impacts of disasters are clearly of 
major concern at the household level.   
 
Figure 4. Greatest Perceived Risks in the Rohini Basin. 
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In alignment with historical state-led disaster management approaches, 90% of the 
respondents feel the primary responsibility for reducing disaster risk lies with the 
government. The remainder generally see it as a family responsibility (5%), with an 
insignificant few feeling donors and the somewhat intangible concept of “the market” 
have primary disaster reduction responsibilities (<0.5% each). The percentages do not 
vary (i.e., there are no significant differences) between the flood and drought samples or 
among wealth classes. Respondents are generally not satisfied with the disaster reduction 
performance of these various actors, with only 21 percent feeling the government is doing 
enough, 10 percent satisfied with donor and market performance, and less than 2 percent 
content with private sector and SHG/NGO performance. Unsurprisingly, the best risk 
reduction appraisal lies with the family, although this is still only at a 26 percent 
satisfaction level, highlighting an opportunity for more solidarity in risk management. 
Despite its perceived poor performance, 94 percent still place foremost trust in the 
government to reduce the risk of disasters. In these perceptions no statistical differences 
were found according to the wealth groups. We now analyze disaster impacts in monetary 
terms (Question 5). 
 
Disaster Impacts  
 
We analyzed household losses due to the 1998 and 2007 floods as well as the drought of 
2004 based on survey responses. Table 5 provides a summary in terms of monetary 
losses. 
 
Table 5. Household Monetary Losses Due to Natural Disasters in 1998, 2007 
(Floods) And 2004 (Drought). Mean and (Standard Deviation) Shown. 
 1998 Flood 2007 Flood 2004 Drought 
Crop Losses $167 (303) $175 (272) $197 (308) 
Total Wage Losses $41 (215) $39 (167) $14 (24) 
Total Additional Exp. $25 (42) $32 (56) $82 (120) 
House Damages $168 (480) $23 (143) $0 
Other Asset Damages $102 (592) $11 (66) $0 
TOTAL $503 (949) $384 (155) $390 (421) 
 
Total losses were highest during the 1998 flood with asset losses representing more 
than a half of the total. Crop losses in both floods were also high and nearly as damaging 
as during the 2004 drought. However, additional expenditures were higher during the 
drought than the floods, primarily due to the additional money needed for fodder, fuel 
wood, and health care. Comparing the total household losses with the annual household 
income of the different wealth classes reveals that disaster impacts in terms of income 
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losses are very dramatic for the “very poor,” but also substantial for the other wealth 
classes (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of Total Household Annual Income Losses  
According to Wealth Class. 
 
 
The differences in losses are highly significant for the 1998 flood (Kruskal Wallis H 
= 11.54, p = .009, df = 3), especially due to the very poor who experienced losses of more 
than 70 percent of their total annual household income. For the 2007 flood, there are also 
substantial group differences between the wealth classes, but these are not significant at p 
! .05 (Kruskal Wallis H = 6.93, p = 0.074, df = 3). In the case of the drought event 
limited differences between wealth classes were experienced. Total average losses for all 
groups is around 43 percent for the 1998 flood, 25 percent for the 2007 flood and 17 
percent for the 2004 drought. 
It has been indicated that for the surveyed households the possibilities to finance 
disaster losses are limited. The next section explains in detail how the households attempt 
to cope with the impacts. 
 
Financial Coping  
 
The initial and obvious source to finance the losses after an event is a household’s own 
income. In the flood sample 73 percent reported that this was not sufficient to cope with 
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the disaster (as income is generated through crop yields, this question was not raised in 
the drought sample). More importantly, there are significant differences between the 
wealth classes ("2 = 16.27, p < 0.001, df = 3). Only 15 percent of the poorest compared 
to around 50 percent of the richest wealth class reported income sufficient to cope with 
impacts. More than 38 percent of the households reported changing livelihoods after 
floods independent of the wealth classes (not significant). Regarding livelihood 
diversification, it can be said that there are only limited diversification opportunities in 
this highly agricultural region.  
Relief, while generally not dependable, is often seen as the primary source of disaster 
risk financing for poor and/or marginalized communities (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2005). 
In the Rohini Basin, 29% of households received relief after floods, with only 19 percent 
receiving compensation after droughts (no differences between wealth classes). While the 
two different hazards do not show significantly different relief payment structures, a clear 
trend can be observed to more relief for the sudden onset hazard ("2 = 3.42, p = .065, df 
= 1). With an average of US$ 8 per household (no significant differences among wealth 
classes), drought compensation is low compared to incurred losses. For both types of 
disasters relief provision is somewhat delayed; the interval is an average of one month for 
flood and four months for drought (highly significant differences Mann-Whitney U = 
220, p < .000) but there are no significant differences among wealth classes.  
Primary sources of funding during and after floods are moneylenders, followed by 
others in the community and the family (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Sources of Household Funding During Floods  
(Percent of Respondents). 
 
Sources of (flood loss) funding accessed during and after disasters do not vary 
significantly among the four wealth classes. Interest rates on loans average around 10 
percent with no significant differences among credit providers (money lenders versus 
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banks, etc.). More than 36 percent of the flood survey respondents indicated migration by 
some family members to compensate for reduced household income (59%) as well as 
losses in wage labour (16%), food insecurity (8%), agricultural losses (7%) and to obtain 
agricultural inputs (10%). Regarding the drought sample and post-drought relief, 34 
percent of respondents would prefer cash, 27 percent food, and 39 percent a mix of both 
cash and food, with no (significant) variations in preference among the wealth classes.  
 
Financing Perspectives 
 
When asked generally which vulnerability reduction activities would improve their 
capacity to respond to floods, the best performers were finance-related, with life 
insurance mentioned by 39 percent, self-help groups by 17 percent, and livestock 
insurance by 9 percent.  
Specific perceptions on insurance were queried only in the drought survey. Only 15 
percent of the respondents had any kind of insurance, primarily life (83% of those 
reporting any insurance), with the remainder having voluntary crop insurance. Most who 
had insurance had become aware of it primarily through the efforts of company agents 
(72%), with the remainder learning from literature sources, family/friends/neighbours and 
government/community programs. Insurance is generally purchased to protect the family 
livelihood security (75%), with some considerations of meeting future expenditure and 
enabling high risk-return investment options (both 10%). The primary reason for not 
having insurance was expense (46%), followed by lack of knowledge (22%) and to a 
lesser degree finding it too complicated a process, not finding it important, and not 
trusting insurance providers (less than 3% each). Twenty five percent referred to 
undefined “other” reasons for not having insurance, which could be interpreted as a 
further lack of knowledge or understanding of the products and/or concepts. Nearly all 
respondents were unaware of any insurance schemes to cover disaster losses. Specific 
opinions on crop insurance were dominated by a lack of knowledge and/or 
understanding, although those responding generally exhibited positive opinions (Figure 
7).  
Floods and droughts in the Rohini Basin are serious threats to household well-being 
for all wealth classes, but floods are especially threatening to the poor. Due to very 
limited savings and low income, climate variability (such as lower precipitation in a 
given year compared to normal years) will likely cause great financial stress even during 
more frequent but less intense events. Most income is derived from the farming of 
household-owned land or agricultural wage labour and primarily used for consumption, 
especially food. 
Sources of funding during and after disasters are therefore very limited, with losses 
mostly funded by donors and moneylenders. The latter are however problematic due to 
the high interest rates they charge (with only 6% of households reporting that loan 
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providers show some flexibility in repayments during droughts), further increasing 
already high indebtedness after disasters. These sources of funding do not vary 
significantly among different wealth classes. However, in relative terms, e.g., loss to 
income, negative disaster impacts to wealthier people are smaller. 
 
Figure 7. Perceptions on Crop Insurance  
(Percentage of Drought Survey Respondents) 
 
 
The risks of drought and other hazards are perceived as high for all wealth classes in 
the area. However, the opportunities to reduce these financial risks are small, generally 
decreasing with diminishing wealth. Furthermore, flood and drought events affect the 
population differentially. That is, the negative effects for drought manifest themselves 
over time, but floods damages primarily occur directly during or shortly after the event. If 
flooding is severe enough, it can also affect crop yields, thus producing severe effects on 
both stock (assets) and flow (seeds for next year). This has important implications for 
relief distribution; while food may be needed during and shortly after a flood, cash or 
seed distribution will be needed for the next season. Cash payments shortly after an event 
would also be beneficial to improve nutrition but it has to be expected that only a 
proportion of the money would actually be spent on food (for a full discussion see 
Levine, 2007). 
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Discussion 
 
Implications for Poverty Traps and Risk Financing 
 
The UP survey results yield at least five implications regarding the interaction of 
poverty traps and disaster financing strategies. First, when assessing the long-term risk of 
falling into poverty traps (cf. Carter and Barrett 2006), it is important to avoid looking 
only at stock effects such as asset losses or capital accumulation (Fanti and Spataro 
2008). In addition, it is necessary to also explicitly incorporate long-term flow effects, 
such as savings and, more important, levels of indebtedness. For the poor, long-term flow 
effects may be more devastating than actual asset losses. Although it may appear from a 
short-term perspective that people could escape a potential poverty trap, it could be that 
their long run position is already weakened and actual growth is dampened due to lower 
(financial) resilience and the increased susceptibility to small variations in weather 
patterns. 
Second, this would result in the need to include path dependencies in livelihood 
models. That is, different household growth paths should be included and differentiated 
dependent on the number and times that shocks occur during a given time period. For 
example, disasters in years two and six of a ten year time period would lead to a different 
growth path (and likelihood of falling into a poverty trap) than would be the case if 
disasters (with the same absolute loss impacts) occurred in years six and eight. 
Third, this would also have consequences for how disasters are to be treated in 
poverty models; instead of deterministic shocks, probability-based approaches are 
needed. This would demand more robust information on potential and preferable 
financing options as the whole range, especially the very extreme cases, of possible 
futures are taken into account. 
Fourth, as the survey results have shown, income for the poor and poorest is not 
sufficient to absorb more extreme weather variations. Out-migration, which is generally 
extensive in northern India (Moench and Dixit 2004), occurred in only 35 percent of rural 
households in the Rohini Basin. Thus, borrowing is one of the most important options for 
loss financing. However, as discussed earlier, indebtedness can seriously affect future 
coping capacity potentially leading into a poverty trap. 
Post-disaster aid can be large, but it can also fluctuate widely from one event to 
another due to factors such as media attention, making it difficult if not impossible to 
depend on for household planning. This does not mean that aid is or would not be 
important in the future. However, (fifthly) aid may have more impact if it is used to 
promote ex-ante strategies, for example to increase households’ financial coping capacity 
for floods and droughts either via risk reduction (mitigation and preparedness), financial 
risk pooling/spreading, or to help in developing markets in the region. The different 
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strategies selected will depend on the wealth level of the household (see Barrett et al. 
2007; Lindell et al. 2006).  
 
Financial Risk Reduction Opportunity: Insurance 
 
Generally speaking, flood risk could be reduced through non-financial means such as 
improved embankments or clearing floodplains, but also through risk transfer such as 
insurance or inter-temporal risk spreading mechanisms such as (contingent) credit. That 
is, in exchange for an (annual) fee, the right is obtained to take out a specific loan amount 
after an event which has to be repaid at contractually fixed conditions. Other potential 
drought risk management strategies include crop diversification, irrigation or insurance 
arrangements. 
Alternatively, index-based insurance instruments could be used to lower the costs and 
prevent moral hazard (i.e. behavioural changes of the insured after the purchase of the 
insurance, making them more risky) for both flood and drought, instead of traditional 
indemnity-based insurance. Index-based insurance schemes base claim payments on 
physical parameters, such as rainfall measured at a weather station, rather than the actual 
loss as in indemnity-based insurance schemes. Transaction costs of issuing contracts and 
settling claims can be drastically reduced, thus offering a viable alternative to traditional 
crop insurance. Furthermore, because of the physical trigger there is no moral hazard; to 
the contrary, farmers will have an incentive to reduce risk (Linnerooth-Bayer and 
Mechler 2009). 
However considering the lack of resources, market access, and understanding of 
financial risk management of vulnerable communities, any attempt to strengthen 
household-level risk financing would need to occur holistically. Disaster mitigation and 
preparedness would need to be capacitated together with risk financing, as inter-linked 
components of a broader strategy for disaster risk management. New financial products 
such as index insurance would likely need to be bundled with other financial products 
such as credit and savings, contributing not just to disaster risk management but also 
general vulnerability reduction and livelihood investment potential. 
Considering the institutional trust placed in the government, it would likely be a 
necessary partner in such an effort to develop risk instruments at the micro-level, similar 
to the case of index-based crop insurance in Malawi (Suarez, Linnerooth-Bayer and 
Mechler 2007). For example, crop loss protection insurance is viewed by most 
respondents as an efficient and trustworthy form of drought compensation/relief, to be 
supported and/or implemented by government. Hence, there does appear to be a keen 
interest and positive impression of its utility for reducing drought risk. Other studies have 
also found that fairly complex mechanisms can be understood rather well even by people 
with little or no formal education (Lybbert 2006, Patt et al. 2008). 
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At the same time, the survey revealed some possible negative consequences of 
providing insurance in poor areas. Of those responding, over half admit difficulties in 
paying premiums. Although based on only a small sample (15), the implications of how 
people fund insurance premiums when income is insufficient cannot be ignored. Forty 
percent reduce consumption, 20 percent use savings, 13 percent take loans, 7 percent 
each sell assets or simply default, while the remaining 13 percent find the funds through 
some “other” means. These actions generally do not help reduce vulnerability, thus 
rendering insurance counter-productive for such cases. Hence, it may be more 
appropriate to use such schemes only for farmers with at least some disposable income. 
As the survey analysis and discussion have shown, risk management-driven poverty 
reduction must be implemented in an integrated manner, that is, through a combination of 
risk reduction efforts and risk financing strategies. Some innovative approaches have 
already been tested with potentially promising results. For example, changing to seed 
types that produce higher yields but are more vulnerable to water scarcity may be too 
risky as a standalone intervention. However, in combination with risk instruments such as 
index-based insurance such an approach seems more promising and can result in a 
growth trajectory with stability guarantees (Hess and Syroka 2005). 
 
Decision-making Challenges 
 
A related topic is the issue of climate change and its potential effects on risk 
financing. Particularly for insurance schemes, climate change may considerably increase 
the ruin probability over time and therefore necessitate increases in premiums or outside 
help (Hochrainer, Mechler and Pflug 2009). Furthermore, inter-generational transfers via 
taxes or pension schemes may help a depressed economy and are therefore important to 
consider in poverty trap discussions (see Fanti and Spataro 2008). Additionally, as the 
survey results have shown, while different financing strategies against weather extremes 
could be very beneficial, the land owned by poor households is usually too small to 
produce enough to bring them out of poverty alone. Hence, area expansion (for example 
by buying or borrowing land), where feasible, could be a strategy for decreasing poverty 
too (see Hanjra, Ferede and Gutta 2009). 
From a modelling perspective to support decision-making, several limitations for 
assessing such traps or trends exist. Future research will assess these limitations and will 
be based on the results and discussions in this study. A one-dimensional (taking only 
financial flows into account) dynamic livelihood model on the household level (Mechler 
et al. 2009) has already been developed and will be expanded to study these questions in 
detail. 
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